Traub Lieberman Insurance Law Blog
A Forum For Recent Insurance Case Law Developments
Friday, January 9, 2015
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Friday, March 7, 2014
Ninth Circuit Holds Extrinsic Facts Triggered Duty to Defend
In
its recent decision in Burlington Ins.
Co. v. CHWC, Inc., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 3941 (9th Cir. Mar. 3,
2014), the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, applying
California law, had occasion to consider an insured’s obligation to consider
extrinsic facts in determining a duty to defend.
The
underlying incident in Burlington involved
injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff when forcibly removed by bouncers
from the insured nightclub, Crazy Horse.
Claimant’s original lawsuit contained a cause of action for assault and
battery for the alleged incident, as well as causes of action for negligent
hiring and premises liability. Crazy
Horse’s insurer, Burlington, was provided copies of the pleadings as well as
police reports concerning the incident.
The initial police reports were consistent with an assault and
battery. A supplemental report, however,
indicated that while claimant was being removed from the club, he became
defiant and began to resist removal. One
of the witnesses interviewed in the supplemental report stated that during this
period of heightened tension, the claimant backed into a stool and fell down
and that this is what may have caused his injuries.
Based
on these facts, in particular the allegations in the complaint alleging that
plaintiff’s injuries resulted solely from an assault and battery, Burlington denied
coverage to Crazy Horse pursuant to its policy’s assault and battery
exclusion. Burlington later received
summary judgment in its favor from a California federal district court. The lower court held that due to the assault
and battery exclusion, and the allegations in the underlying complaint, “there
was never a possibility of coverage.”
On
appeal, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the reference in the police report
to the claimant falling on a stool raised the possibility that his injuries
were not solely the result of an assault and battery. Citing to the seminal California decision in Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 419 P.2d 168,
176 (Cal. 1966) concerning an insurer’s duty to consider extrinsic facts in
determining the duty to defend, the court noted that while some aspects of the
police reports substantiated an assault and battery, “some of the witness
statements provided to Burlington stated that [claimant] was injured when he
tried to sit down on a stool, lost his footing, and hit his head on the wall.” This version of event, explained the court,
if truly the cause of claimant’s injuries, would not fall within the assault
and battery exclusion.
Thus,
explained the court, notwithstanding the actual allegations in the pleadings,
and notwithstanding the witness statements in the police reports suggesting
that claimant was injured solely as a result of force applied by the Crazy
Horse bouncers, the extrinsic facts at least raised the possibility of
coverage, which was sufficient to trigger a duty to defend. As the court explained:
Although as originally pleaded [claimant’s] negligence claim
was predicated on the theory that he had been assaulted, the extrinsic facts
available to Burlington revealed the possibility that [claimant] could amend
his negligence claim to allege theories of liability that would fall outside
the assault-or-battery exclusion. Under well-settled California law, that
possibility was enough to trigger Burlington's duty to defend.
Tuesday, March 4, 2014
California Court Denies Summary Judgment on Known Conditions Exclusion
In
its recent decision in Lennar Mare Island
v. Steadfast Ins. Co., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26405 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 28,
2014), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California
had occasion to consider the relationship between a fixed site pollution
liability policy and a remediation cost containment policy.
The Lennar decision concerns environmental
liabilities at a former Naval base on Mare Island in Vallejo, California. The site was transferred to the City of
Vallejo in 2002. The City agreed to
undertake an environmental remediation of the site that would be funded by the
Navy. The City later transferred the
property to Lennar Mare Island, LLC (“LMI”).
LMI, in turn, contracted with CH2M Hill Constructors, Inc. (“CCI”) to
perform the required environmental remediation.
Steadfast
Insurance Company issued two policies relevant to the site. First, it issued a Remediation Stop Loss
policy to CCI (the “RSL Policy”), providing cost overrun protection with
respect to CCI’s remediation efforts.
Second, Steadfast issued an Environmental Liability Insurance policy
(the “ELI Policy”) to LMI that insured against cleanup costs resulting from a
pollution condition not known to LMI prior to the policy period, but instead
first discovered during the policy period.
The
Steadfast policies referenced each other in an effort to ensure that they did
not provide overlapping coverage. Thus,
the ELI Policy defined “Known Pollution Conditions” as:
… all conditions specifically described in the Scope of Work
Endorsement to the Remediation Stop Loss Policy . . . and which require or may ultimately require any form of remedial
investigation or action . . .
The
Scope of Work Endorsement in the RSL Policy, in turn, made reference to the
conditions and activities specifically outlined in that policy and certain
attachments thereto. The RSL Policy also
contained the term Known Pollution Conditions, which it defined as being
limited to the conditions described in the Scope of Work Endorsement requiring
any form of remedial investigation or action.
At
issue in the Lennar decision was LMI’s
right to insurance coverage for PCB contamination in Building 116 of the
site. The RSL Policy’s Scope of Work
Endorsement, and certain attachments thereto, made reference to PCB
contamination in concrete floor slabs in Building 116. The endorsement also referred to PCB
contamination in transformer pads in Building 116. The RSL Policy did not, however, make
reference to PCB contamination in the wood floor of Building 116. Thus, when CCI encountered PCB contamination
in the building’s wood floor during the policy period, a question was raised as
to whether LMI was entitled to remediation cost coverage for this contamination
under the ELI Policy.
LMI
filed a declaratory judgment action and promptly moved for summary
judgment. Steadfast stated in opposition
to the motion that it had obtained several documents suggesting that LMI and/or
CCI was aware of the PCB contamination in the wood floor prior to the inception
date of the ELI Policy, and thus it may be a Known Pollution Condition for
which coverage was unavailable.
Steadfast argued, therefore, that at a minimum, it should be entitled to
further discovery on the issue. Steadfast,
in fact, had been pursuing such additional discovery but was mired in several
non-party discovery disputes at the time LMI filed for summary judgment. LMI countered that any such discovery was
irrelevant, since the ELI Policy defined the term Known Pollution Conditions as
anything identified in the RSL Policy’s Scope of Work Endorsement, and that as
such, anything not identified in the Scope of Work Endorsement was not a Known
Pollution Condition. In other words,
because the Scope of Work Endorsement did not specifically identify PCB
contamination in the wood floor of Building 116, it necessarily followed that
this could not be a Known Pollution Condition for the purpose of the ELI
Policy, regardless of when LMI first became aware of or discovered this
condition.
The
court disagreed with LMI’s reading of the two policies. While the RSL Policy stated that only those
conditions specifically identified could be considered Known Pollution
Conditions for the purpose of the RSL Policy, the definition of Known Pollution
Conditions in the ELI Policy contained no similar restriction. In other words, an area of contamination
could be considered a Known Pollution Condition for the purpose of the ELI
Policy even if not specifically identified in the RSL Policy’s Scope of
Work. In any event, the ELI Policy’s insuring
agreement made clear that coverage was unavailable for any pollution condition
discovered outside of the policy period.
The court reasoned that LMI’s interpretation of the ELI Policy “that
anything not listed as a known condition in the RSL Policy necessarily was
discovered during the policy period – would collapse the two provisions of the
ELI Policy [i.e., the discovery requirement and the known conditions
prohibition] into one.” Thus, the court
denied LMI’s motion for summary judgment without prejudice, and permitted
Steadfast additional time to take discovery into the known conditions issue.
Friday, February 28, 2014
Maryland Court Holds Prejudice Rule Applies to Claims Made and Reported Policy
In its recent decision in Navigators
Specialty Ins. Co. v. Med. Benefits Administrators of Maryland, 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 22631 (D. Md. Feb. 21, 2014), the United States District Court for
the District of Maryland had occasion to consider whether Maryland Code §
19-110, which establishes a prejudice requirement for late notice disclaimers,
applies to claims made and reported policies.
Navigators insured Medical Benefits Administrators of
Maryland (“MBA”) under successive claims made and reported professional
liability policies for periods October 31, 2009 to October 31, 2010 and October
31, 2010 to October 31, 2011. MBA was a
claims administrator for Brit Insurance with respect to employer benefit
plans. A dispute arose between Brit and
MBA concerning funds that MBA allegedly failed to repay or reconcile, and
litigation ultimately followed.
While the parties disputed when Brit first asserted its claim
against MBA – prior to the first of the two policies or during the term of one
of the policies – the court ultimately determined that the claim was first made
while the 09-10 Navigators’ policy was in effect. MBA, however, did not report the claim to
Navigators until July 2011. Navigators
thus contended that MBA’s failure to have reported the claim prior to the
October 31, 2010 expiration of the 09-10 policy vitiated any right that MBA had
to coverage under that policy. MBA countered
that under Maryland law, its failure to have reported the claim while the 09-10
policy was still in effect would only serve as a bar to coverage if Navigators
was actually prejudiced as a result.
In support of its assertion, MBA relied on Maryland Code §
19-110, which states:
An insurer may disclaim coverage on a
liability insurance policy on the ground that the insured . . . has breached
the policy by failing to cooperate with the insurer or by not giving the
insurer required notice only if the insurer establishes by a preponderance of
the evidence that the lack of cooperation or notice has resulted in actual
prejudice to the insurer.
While this rule has been applied routinely to
occurrence-based policies, the court noted that there were only a handful of
Maryland cases that considered it in the context of claims made and reported
policies. In Sherwood Brands, Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 13 A.3d 1268 (Md. 2011),
Maryland’s Supreme Court applied in the rule in the context of a claims-made
policy. Two subsequent Maryland federal
district courts distinguished the holding in Sherwood when considering claims made and reported policies. The court also noted the recent decision in McDowell Bldg., LLC v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co.,
2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 132854 (D. Md. Sept. 17, 2013), where Maryland’s federal
district court applied the rule in the context of a claims made and reported
policy.
In considering these cases, the court focused heavily on the
reasoning in Sherwood, in particular
the Sherwood Court’s determination
that the purpose of § 19-110 was to make “policy provisions requiring notice
to, and cooperation with, the insurer covenants and not conditions.” Accordingly, the court agreed that the rule
articulated in Sherwood applies to
all policies, including claims made and reported policies. As such, the court determined that Navigators
was required to demonstrate actual prejudice, by a preponderance of the
evidence, in order to disclaim coverage under the 09-10 policy.
Tuesday, February 25, 2014
New York Court Holds Claimants Had No Standing to Sue Professional Liability Insurer
In its recent decision in Commonwealth Land Title Ins Co. v. American
Signature Services, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22172 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 20,
2014), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York
had occasion to consider when and under what circumstances a claimant can bring
a direct action against an insurer.
Alterra insured American Signature,
a title insurance agency, under a professional liability policy. While the policy was in effect, American
Signature was named as a defendant in a lawsuit brought by two title insurance
companies for whom American Signature had been an agent. Plaintiffs named Alterra as a direct
defendant in their suit on the theory that they were third-party beneficiaries
of the policy, and that as such, they were entitled to seek indemnification
from Alterra directly. In the
alternative, plaintiffs sought a ruling that Alterra had a duty to defend and
indemnify American Safety in connection with their lawsuit, as Alterra had
denied any such obligation to American Signature, and in fact, had commenced
its own coverage action against American Signature seeking a rescission of the
policy or, in the alternative, a declaration that it had no coverage
obligations in connection with the underlying suit.
Citing to Lang v. Hanover, 3 N.Y.3d 350 (N.Y. 2004), Alterra argued that under
New York common law, an injured party has no direct cause of action against the
insurer of a tortfeasor. The Lang decision acknowledged that New York
Insurance Law §3420(a) creates a limited exception to this rule by allowing
claimants to bring a direct action against a tortfeasor’s insurer only after
obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor, and only then when the judgment
“remains unsatisfied at the expiration of thirty days from the serving of
notice of entry of judgment upon the attorney for the insured, or upon the
insured, and upon the insurer … .” In
summarizing the Lang decision, the
Eastern District explained that the New York Court of Appeals “determined that
compliance with the requirements of Section
3420(a)(2) is a condition precedent to any direct action against the
insurance company,” and that as such, “an injured third party has no cause of
action against an insurer at common law, but may bring such an action under
Section 3420 so long as the plaintiff has met the conditions set forth in Section 3420(a)(2).”
While plaintiffs conceded that
they did not yet have a judgment against American Signature, they nevertheless
argued that a direct action was permissible because the Alterra policy was not
governed by New York Insurance Law §3420, which by its terms applies to policies
“insuring against liability for injury to person … or against liability for
injury to, or destruction of, property.”
Plaintiffs argued that as a professional liability policy, the Alterra
policy was not one insuring bodily injury or property damage, and that as such,
a direct action should be permitted. The
court rejected this argument, explaining that §3420 is not a limitation on
direct actions, but rather an exception to the common law rule prohibiting such
an action. As the court explained:
… the New York
Court of Appeals in Lang rejected
this ap-proach, observing that New York common law does not recognize a third
party's claim against an insurer because of the lack of privity between them,
and that Section 3420 grants a
limited statutory cause of action where one does not exist under the common
law.
This common law rule, explained
the court, is not limited to claims for bodily injury or property damage, but
instead applies to any direct actions by claimants against the insurer of a
tortfeasor, regardless of the nature of the underlying claim. As such, the court concluded that it need not
reach the issue of whether §3420 applied to the Alterra policy, since even if
it did, a direct action could only proceed after a judgment. In passing, the court noted that if §3420 did
not govern the Alterra policy, then plaintiffs could never have a direct cause
of action against Alterra under New York common law. In passing, however, the court pointed to
several New York decisions holding that the statute applies broadly to any
policy issued or delivered in New York, not just ones insuring against bodily
injury or property damage.
Labels:
3420
,
Direct Action
Tuesday, February 18, 2014
New York’s Highest Court Vacates Its Decision in K2
In its
February 18, 2014 decision in K2
Investment Group, LLP v. American Guarantee & Liability Ins. Co., New
York’s Court of Appeals – New York’s highest court – had occasion to revisit
its prior ruling concerning the effect of an insurer’s breach of the duty to
defend.
By
decision dated June 11, 2013, the Court of Appeals seemingly articulated a new
rule regarding the consequences of an insurer’s breach of the duty to
defend. K2 Inv. Group, LLC v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 21
N.Y.3d 384 (NY 2013). Specifically, the
Court held that by having wrongfully denied a defense to its insured under a
professional liability policy, American Guarantee “lost its right” to rely on
certain policy exclusions for indemnity purposes. Relying on its decision in Lang v. Hanover Ins. Co., 3 N.Y.3d 350
(NY 2004) – a case involving the insurer’s right to contest the insured’s
liability for an underlying loss after breaching the duty to defend – the Court
explained the new rule as follows:
… we now make clear that Lang, at least as it applies to such situations, means what it
says: an insurance company that has disclaimed its duty to defend "may
litigate only the validity of its disclaimer." If the disclaimer is found
bad, the insurance company must indemnify its insured for the resulting
judgment, even if policy exclusions would otherwise have negated the duty to
indemnify.
The
Court justified this rule on fairness grounds, explaining that:
This rule will give insurers an incentive to defend the
cases they are bound by law to defend, and thus to give insureds the full
benefit of their bargain. It would be unfair to insureds, and would promote
unnecessary and wasteful litigation, if an insurer, having wrongfully abandoned
its insured's defense, could then require the insured to litigate the effect of
policy exclusions on the duty to indemnify.
In so
ruling, the K2 Court notably did not
cite to its prior decision in Servidone
Construction Corp. v. Security Ins. Co., 64 N.Y.2d 419 (NY 1985), wherein
the Court held that an insurer’s breach of the duty to defend cannot
operate to enlarge a policy’s coverage.
Thus, the decision in K2 stood
in direct conflict with Servidone.
Following
the Court’s June 11, 2013 decision, American Guarantee moved for reargument,
primarily on the basis that the Court failed to address the decision in Servidone, and thus created an
inconsistency in the case law. The Court
granted American Guarantee’s motion for reargument – a relief afforded by the
Court of Appeals on only rare occasions – and a second round of oral argument
was held on January 7, 2014.
In its
February 18, 2014 decision, Judge Robert Smith, writing for a four-judge
majority (two judges dissented and one judge abstained) acknowledged that the
Court’s June 11, 2013 holding was irreconcilable with its prior decision in Servidone. While the Court reaffirmed its prior holding
in Lang that an insurer is not
permitted to relitigate issues in the underlying case if it breaches its duty
to defend, the Court recognized that this issue is distinct from whether an
insurer is permitted to litigate its indemnity obligation subsequent to a
wrongful denial of its duty to defend.
In so
holding, the Court noted that “[t]here is much to be said for the rule” it
articulated in its initial June 11th decision. The Court nevertheless acknowledged that the
majority of jurisdictions follow the Servidone
rule – the principle exceptions being Illinois and Connecticut. The Court further observed that K2 failed to
present “any indication that the Servidone
rule has proved unworkable, or caused significant injustice or hardship, since
it was adopted in 1985.” Under the
circumstances, the Court found it preferable to follow its prior holding in Servidone, explaining:
When our Court decides a question of insurance law, insurers
and insureds alike should ordinarily be entitled to assume that the decision
will remain unchanged unless or until the Legislature decides otherwise. In
other words, the rule of stare decisis,
while it is not inexorable, is strong enough to govern this case.
With
this in mind, the Court turned to the application of the policy exclusions, and
concluded that these exclusions presented a sufficient question of fact to
defeat K2’s underlying motion for summary judgment.
Writing
for a two-judge dissent, Judge Victoria Graffeo expressed her belief that an
insurer should be penalized for breaching the duty to defend. In her opinion, Servidone should be limited to questions of coverage “in the first
instance,” i.e., whether a loss falls
within a policy’s insuring agreement.
While she agreed that an insurer that breaches a duty to defend should
not be made to indemnify a loss not falling within the scope of a policy’s
insuring agreement (i.e., “a homeowner's policy would not provide malpractice
liability coverage”), she reasoned that this rule should not apply to policy
exclusions. As she explained, “[p]rohibiting exclusions from being collaterally
invoked provides an insurer with an incentive to appear on behalf of the
policyholder in the underlying lawsuit, as it agreed to do in return for the
payment of premiums.”
With
the Court of Appeals’ decision to vacate its earlier ruling in K2, New York now returns comfortably to
the majority rule that acknowledges an insurer's right to contest its indemnity
obligation is separate and apart from any issue of its duty to defend.
Monday, February 17, 2014
New York’s Highest Court Holds Limitation on Suit Provision Unreasonable
In
its recent decision in Executive Plaza,
LLC v. Peerless Ins. Co., 2014 NY Slip Op 898, 2014 N.Y. LEXIS 165 (N.Y.
Feb. 13, 2014), the Court of Appeals of New York, New York’s highest court, on
a question certified from the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, had occasion to consider the enforceability of a policy provision
restricting the time in which an insured could bring suit against the insurer.
Peerless
insured Executive Plaza under a fire loss policy that provided $1 million in
coverage for “actual cash value” or “replacement cost.” The policy conditioned coverage on the lost
or damaged property first being repaired or replaced, and that such repairs and
replacements be made “as soon as reasonably possible after the loss or
damage.” The policy also contained a
clause titled “Legal Action Against Us,” which stated, in pertinent part, that
no suit could be brought under the policy unless the “action is brought within
2 years after the date on which the direct physical loss or damage occurred.”
Following
a fire loss, Peerless paid Executive Plaza approximately $758,000 in actual
cash value. Executive Plaza subsequently
notified Peerless that it would be seeking the balance of the policy’s limits
in replacement costs. In response,
Peerless advised Executive Plaza that to be entitled to reimbursement for any
replacement costs, it would need to submit documentation verifying completion
of the repairs. Executive Plaza claims
that it undertook reasonable efforts to perform such repairs, but that it was
not able to do so within two years of the fire that caused the loss. In fact, Executive Plaza was not able to
complete the repairs until nearly three years and eight months after the
fire. At that time, Executive Plaza
sought reimbursement for the replacement costs under the policy. Peerless denied coverage for the costs on the
ground that the two-year limitation period had expired.
In
the ensuing coverage litigation, the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of New York granted Peerless’ motion to dismiss on the basis
of the “Legal Action Against Us” clause, noting “that the two-year limitation
period in the Policy is reasonable, as New York Courts have consistently upheld
two-year limitations periods in insurance contracts as reasonable.” The matter was appealed to the Second
Circuit, which in turn certified the question:
If a fire insurance policy contains
(1) a provision allowing reimbursement of
replacement costs only after the property was replaced and requiring the
property to be replaced ‘as soon as reasonably possible after the loss’; and
(2) a provision requiring an insured to
bring suit within two years after the loss;
is an insured covered for replacement costs if the insured
property cannot reasonably be replaced within two years?
In
considering the issue, the Court of Appeals noted its own prior case law allowing
for a contractual modification of a statute of limitations. In fact, the Court had previously upheld
“time to sue” periods in insurance policies of even shorter durations. The guiding principle in these cases,
explained the court, is whether the limited time period is reasonable under the
circumstances. With this in mind, the
court focused on the issue of whether it was reasonable to expect that an
insured, within two years of a fire,
could be able to repair and replace all damaged property. The Court concluded that the two-year period
was not necessarily unreasonable, but that the accrual date for the two-year
period was. As the Court explained:
It is neither fair nor reasonable to require a suit within two
years from the date of the loss, while imposing a condition precedent to the
suit — in this case, completion of replacement of the property — that cannot be
met within that two-year period. A "limitation period" that expires
before suit can be brought is not really a limitation period at all, but simply
a nullification of the claim. It is true that nothing required defendant to
insure plaintiff for replacement cost in excess of actual cash value, but
having chosen to do so defendant may not insist on a "limitation
period" that renders the coverage valueless when the repairs are
time-consuming.
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