In its recent decision
in Berkley Regional Ins. Co. v.
Philadelphia Indemnity Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 15998 (5th
Cir. Aug. 2, 2012), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,
applying Texas law, had occasion to consider how and under what circumstances
an excess/umbrella insurer is prejudiced as a result of an insured’s failure to
provide timely notice of occurrence or suit.
The insured, Towers of
Town Lake Condominiums (“Tower”), had a $1 million primary policy with Nautilus
and a $20 million excess/umbrella policy with Philadelphia. Towers was
sued when a dentist slipped and fell on its premises. It placed Nautilus
on notice of the suit, but did not give immediate notice to Philadelphia.
At a mediation held prior to trial, the plaintiff’s “bottom” demand was
$215,000 and Nautilus’ “top” offer was $150,000. The parties reached an
impasse and the case, therefore, proceeded to trial. A jury subsequently
rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff in the amount of just under $1.7
million. On the day of the verdict, Towers finally gave notice to
Philadelphia. Philadelphia thereafter denied coverage based on late
notice.
The Philadelphia
policy required prompt notice of any occurrence involving permanent
disabilities, or otherwise involving a coverage issue that could result in a
reservation of rights or disclaimer of coverage. Additionally, the
Philadelphia policy had a provision allowing it to associate in the defense,
settlement and investigation of any underlying claim, at the discretion of
Philadelphia. Nautilus, suing on behalf of Towers, argued that
Philadelphia’s late notice disclaimer was not valid as Philadelphia was not
prejudiced by Towers’ untimely notice. The lower court held in Nautilus’ favor. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit was asked whether
as a matter of law “[d]oes the failure to give notice to an excess carrier
until after an adverse jury verdict constitute evidence of prejudice that
forfeits coverage?”
Looking to Texas case
law on late notice, the Fifth Circuit observed that the purpose of notice
provisions are to protect the insurer’s right and ability to participate in the
underlying suit and to minimize its potential loss. While these cases
generally involved primary insurers, the court could find no basis for drawing
a distinction between the interests of primary insurers and excess insurers, explaining:
While
their responsibilities are different and, thus, they may not suffer prejudice
in all circumstances where a primary carrier would, [excess insurers]
nonetheless have a contract with the insured and are entitled to rely upon the
same contract principles [as do primary insurers].
The court noted that
while it is not always easy to determine prejudice, certain bright lines can be
drawn. For instance, prejudice will be presumed where notice is first
given after a default judgment. The court further observed that notice
given once the case is “over” is too late, citing to the Texas Supreme Court
decision in National Union Fire Ins. Co.
v. Crocker, 246 S.W.3d 603 (Tex. 2008).
Nautilus nevertheless argued that Crocker
was inapplicable because the case was defended by Nautilus. In other words, a distinction should be drawn
between a situation where a primary insurer does not have a chance to defend
and where an excess insurer does not receive notice until after verdict. The Fifth Circuit rejected this distinction, explaining:
[Nautilus]
argues that this case is more like the “better late than never” cases and not
like Crocker because no default was entered; rather, the case was litigated by
competent counsel to a jury verdict. We
disagree … Philadelphia was not just notified “late,” it was notified after all
material aspects of the trial process had concluded and an adverse jury verdict
was entered. It lost the ability to do
any investigation or conduct its own analysis of the case, as well as the
ability to “join in” Nautilus’ evaluation of the case.
Just as important for
the court was that Philadelphia lost its opportunity to participate in the
pretrial mediation:
Mediation,
by nature, is a dynamic process, and for that very reason, parties are expected
(and usually ordered) to appear ready to negotiate and with “full” settlement
authority … Thus, we cannot fully know what effect, if any, Philadelphia’s
participation would have had on this process – e.g., convincing Nautilus to
take [plaintiff’s] offer of $215,000, convincing [plaintiff] to come down
further or accept Nautilus’ offer of $150,000, or even “dropping down” to pay
the $65,000 difference between the parties’ offers (with or without a side
agreement between itself and Nautilus to litigate who must ultimately pay that
amount). All of these rights were lost,
leaving Philadelphia holding the bag for more than $700,000 in excess liability
…
Finally, the court
rejected Nautilus’ argument that Philadelphia’s rights were protected since it
had an opportunity to participate in the appeal of the underlying verdict. Given the posture of an appeal and the
standard of review applicable to the appellate issues, the court observed that the
“cows had long since left the barn when Philadelphia was invited to close the
barn door.”
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