Yanting Zhang
sued California Capital Insurance Company (“CCIC”) for breach of contract, bad
faith, and violation of the UCL, arising from the handling of a claim for fire
loss at a commercial property owned by Zhang.
The UCL cause of action alleged that CCIC falsely advertised a promise
to provide timely coverage in the event of a compensable loss, when CCIC had no
intention of paying the true value of fire loss claims. CCIC demurred to that cause of action on the
grounds that a UCL claim cannot be supported by a violation of conduct
prohibited by the UIPA. The trial court
granted the demurrer and Zhang filed a petition for writ of mandate to the
Court of Appeal which reversed the trial court decision. The Supreme Court granted review.
The opinion in Zhang is the latest in a line of
decisions by California appellate courts growing out of Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Cos. (1988) 46 Cal.3d 287, in
which the Supreme Court held that there was no private right of action for
violation of an insurer’s duties under the UIPA. The decision in Moradi-Shalal ended years of third party bad faith litigation in
California. The court in Moradi-Shalal held that the UIPA only
authorized administrative enforcement by the California Insurance Commissioner
for violations of the UIPA, but such did not affect actions based on traditional
common law theories of private recovery against insurers. Those were said to include claims for “fraud,
infliction of emotional distress, and (as to the insured) either breach of
contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.”
In Manufacturers Life Ins. Co. v. Superior
Court (1995) 10 Cal.4th 257, the Supreme Court held that Moradi-Shalal did not preclude first
party UCL actions based on grounds independent from the UIPA, even if the
conduct also violates the UIPA. In that
case, the court allowed an action under the UCL by an insurance agent against
insurers for violations of the California anti-trust statutes, known as the
Cartwright Act. The plaintiff agent had
alleged an insurance industry conspiracy against it in retaliation for
disclosure of the true cost of settlement annuities. Manufacturers
Life was followed by State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co. v. Superior Court (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1093, in
which the Court of Appeal held an insured was entitled to pursue a UCL claim
against its first party insurer (in a Northridge Earthquake related claim)
based on fraud and common law bad faith claims handling. A split in California law resulted when
another district court of appeal disagreed with the State Farm decision, holding in Textron
Financial Corp. v. Nat. Union Fire Ins. Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th
1061, that a common law first party bad faith claim could not support a UCL
cause of action where the alleged bad faith conduct was the type proscribed in
the UIPA.
The Supreme
Court in Zhang resolved the split in
California authority by disapproving Textron
and agreeing with State Farm. The majority decision, signed by five of the
seven Supreme Court justices, held that a common law first party bad faith
claims handling action could qualify as any of the three statutory forms of
unfair competition: the conduct was said to be (1) unlawful (under the common
law), (2) unfair to the insured, and (3) may qualify as fraudulent business
practices. The court noted that the
concerns raised in Moradi-Shalal (primarily
proliferation in litigation) would not arise because “UCL remedies are limited
in scope, generally extending only to injunctive relief and restitution.” Therefore, a UCL claim did not duplicate bad
faith claims which are for damages. The
court said that its rejection of Textron
did not affect its prior decisions in third party insurance claims cases. As to the insured’s cause of action in the
case before it, the court said that the UCL cause of action was supported by
both the allegations of false advertising and of common law bad faith claims
handling.
Justice Wenegar
wrote a separate concurring decision, joined by Justice Liu, to say that the
majority decision did not go far enough.
She argued that since the UIPA did not directly prohibit a private right
of action, but merely did not allow one, a UCL claim could be based on its
violation (raising the specter of possible third party claims). The majority of the court disagreed with
Justice Wenegar in Footnote 8, saying that her conclusion was directly contrary
to the court’s holdings in Maufacturers
Life and Moradi-Shalal.
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