In
its recent decision in Arch Ins. Co. v.
Commercial Steel Treating Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121574 (E.D. Mich.
Aug. 27, 2013), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan had occasion to consider the application of a pollution exclusion in a
D&O policy to a violation of an air emissions permit.
Arch
insured Curtis Metal Finishing Company (“Curtis”) under a Private Company
Management Liability and Crime Insurance policy. Curtis operated a zinc-phosphate plating
operation in Sterling Heights, Michigan.
As a result of a windstorm that damaged its exhaust equipment, Curtis
operated its facility without the benefit of all required air emissions control
technologies for a period of nearly three months, thereby violating its air use
permit issued by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. Following several inspections, the Michigan
Department of Natural Resources and Environment (“MDNRE”) issued a Violation
Notice to Curtis.
Curtis
forwarded a copy of the notice to Arch, and requested coverage for any
subsequent criminal proceedings that might be brought by the state. Arch, in turn, denied coverage based on a
pollution exclusion arising from, based upon, or attributable to any:
a. discharge,
dispersal, release, escape, seepage, migration or disposal of Pollutants, . . .
or any threat of such discharge, dispersal, release, escape, seepage, migration
or disposal; or
b. direction,
request or voluntary decision to test for, abate, monitor, clean up, remove,
contain, treat, detoxify or neutralize Pollutants . . . .
In
fact, the Macomb County prosecutor later commenced criminal proceedings against
Curtis, alleging a count for failure to report an equipment malfunction and a
count for failure to comply with its emissions permit. As a result of Arch’s denial of coverage,
Curtis retained its own counsel and eventually negotiated a plea of no contest
in return for payment of $90,000 to be used for an environmental study. Arch later brought a coverage action against
Curtis seeking a declaration that it had no coverage obligations with respect
to the settlement or Curtis’ defense costs.
On
motion for summary judgment, Arch argued that both subparagraphs of the
pollution exclusion applied. With
respect to subparagraph b., Arch contended that the air use permit initially
issued to Curtis was a “direction to … clean up … Pollutants,” and that the
underlying criminal action, therefore, arose out of or was attributable to this
direction. Alternatively, Curtis argued
that subparagraph a. of the exclusion was applicable since the underlying
criminal action arose out of Curtis’ improper discharge of pollutants into the
atmosphere. Curtis, on the other hand,
argued that the underlying complaint contained no allegation of a discharge of
pollutants, and that because its facility is kept at a negative air pressure,
any emissions would have been into its own building rather than into the
atmosphere. The court rejected Curtis’
argument, noting that the plain language of the exclusion applied to any
discharge of pollutants, or any threatened discharge of pollutants, and that
the exclusion did not specific the location of the discharge. In
other words, the court refused to read into the exclusion a distinction between
traditional environmental pollution and indoor air pollution.
Curtis
also argued that the underlying criminal action pertained to permitting
violations and failure to disclose rather than a discharge of pollutants. The court rejected this argument, finding
that Curtis could not ignore purpose behind the permit:
The purpose of the Air Use Permit was to prevent the release
of potentially hazardous fumes ... A direct result of Defendants' operation of
Lines 11 and 14 without a functioning scrubber, in violation of the Air Use
Permit, is the release of fumes from Lines 11 and 14 into the Sterling Heights
facility. There is thus "significantly more than a remote connection"
between Defendants' permit violations and the actual or threatened release of
pollutants from Lines 11 and 14 … Furthermore, even if there was no threatened
or actual release of pollutants from Lines 11 and 14, the criminal charges
arise out of a direction or request from MDNRE, via the Air Use Permit, to
abate potentially hazardous pollutants. Accordingly, both subparagraphs a. and
b. of the Pollution Exclusion apply to bar the criminal charges against
Defendants.
The
court also rejected Curtis’ arguments that the amount of actual emissions from
the facility was insignificant, explaining:
Whether any pollutants actually leaked is immaterial where
Defendants have clearly violated their Air Use Permit, which directed
Defendants to abate pollutants. The Pollution Exclusion expressly applies to
such criminal charges. Plaintiff thus properly denied coverage for Defendants'
claims under the Policy, and Plaintiff is entitled to summary declaratory
judgment that the Policy does not apply to the underlying criminal matters.
While
the court held that the pollution exclusion operated to preclude Curtis’ right
to coverage, the court also agreed in passing that the $90,000 payment made by
Curtis to settle the underlying matter – an amount to be used to conduct a
study of a nearby lake – did not qualify as “loss” under the Arch policy, a
term specifically defined to exclude fines.
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